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Abstract 
Some countries allow physicians to balance bill patients, that is, to bill a fee above 
the one that is negotiated with, and reimbursed by the health authorities. Balance billing 
is known for restricting access to physicians’ services while supplemental insurance 
against balance billing amounts is supposed to alleviate the access problem. This paper 
analyzes in a theoretical setting the consequences of balance billing on the fees setting 
and on the inequality of access among the users of physicians’ services. It also shows that 
supplemental insurance against the expenses associated with balance billing, rather than 
alleviating the access problem, increases it. 
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1 Introduction 
In many countries, the level of the physicians’ basis fee results from a negotiation 
between a health authority, representatives of medical doctors and sometimes 
representatives of health services users as well. In a few countries, some physicians are 
allowed to bill an extra fee on top of the basis fee. This practice is known as balance 
billing. The public health insurer reimburses the physicians’ basis fee only, or a fraction 
thereof. The patients pay the extra fee, unless privately insured against it. This paper aims 
at analyzing the consequences of both balance billing (BB, henceforth) and the insurance 
against the expenses generated by BB, on the fees setting and on the resulting access 
inequalities among the users of physicians’ services.  
Few countries allow physicians to bill patients a fee above the one that is 
reimbursed by the health authorities. In France, BB has been allowed since 1980 to slow 
down the growing health care expenditures by avoiding increases in the basis fee. BB has 
been unregulated in France until 1990, and then restricted to physicians, mainly 
specialists, with a specific career pattern. According to the Caisse Nationale de 
l’Assurance Maladie (2011), the BB amounts have more than doubled between 1990 and 
2010. On average, it amounts to 12% of physicians’ total revenue (17% for specialists in 
general, 32% for surgeons). Private insurers in France can offer supplemental policies to 
reimburse partially or totally the expenses generated by physicians’ balance billing. 94% 
have a private supplemental health insurance in France, but only 40% are insured against 
BB expenses. Private insurance against BB expenses is restricted in Belgium by a strict 
regulation of the health insurance sector. In the US, additional prices are now limited to 
about 10% of the Medicare fee while a new law in France restricts the BB amounts to 
150% of the basis fee since October 2012.  
It is generally recognized that BB increases inequalities because it restricts access. 
Our approach specifically addresses the issue of access to physicians’ services. 
Buchmueller et al (2004) explain that equity and access to physicians’ services are 
definitely an issue in France where balance billing and unregulated supplemental 
insurance coexist. In particular, a study by Buchmueller and Couffinhal (2004) found 
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that, controlling for socioeconomic and demographic characteristics and detailed 
measures of health status, adults with private insurance were 86% more likely to visit a 
physician within a one month period than those without complementary coverage. This 
difference is comparable to differences between insured and uninsured adults in the US, 
where the insured/uninsured differential in out-of-pocket costs is much greater. Després 
et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence that people without supplemental insurance 
forego treatments that are not well reimbursed; they forego treatments twice as much as 
privately insured people. Després et al (2011) highlight that foregoing treatment is 
significantly more frequent where BB amounts are higher.  
Rather than focusing on access, the existing theoretical papers on fees formation 
under balance billing analyze the important quality issue. Glazer and McGuire (1993) 
consider that the extra fee is a simple transfer from patients to physicians and its level is 
therefore irrelevant from the efficiency point of view. They do not recognize that some 
patients might stop seeking physicians’ services because those are too expensive. The 
same happens in Kifmann and Scheuer (2006) because of another assumption: Physicians 
have information about the patients willingness to pay and they are therefore able to 
perfectly price discriminate among them, allowing all patients to access their services. 
We depart from these papers by implicitly assuming asymmetric information about 
patients’ ability to pay, letting physicians to balance bill all patients with the same fee. 
Intuitively, we expect that balance billing results in lower basis fees since 
physicians can compensate a lower basis fee with a higher extra fee. However, this very 
effect eventually results in higher basis fees. Indeed, the health authority anticipates the 
following effects: the physician’s best reply to a higher basis fee is the setting of a lower 
extra fee, which is the price paid by the patients unless privately insured. This logically 
results in a higher demand for medical visits. Therefore, the trade-off faced by the health 
authority is the resulting higher consumers surplus against lower public expenses, 
provided physicians are granted a given level of revenue. When balance billing is not 
allowed, such a positive effect of the basis fee on the consumers surplus is absent since 
patients pay the same (say zero), whatever the level of the basis fee. The trade-off 
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vanishes as the health authority only aims at reducing lower public expenses for paying 
the basis fees. Therefore, allowing balance billing need not lead to lower basis fees and to 
lower public expenses. Moreover, balance billing always increases inequality in access to 
physicians’ services trivially because patients with the lowest revenues cannot afford the 
extra fees. 
Some of these effects are reinforced by the presence of private insurance when it 
is not regulated. The basis fee is lower when some patients are privately insured against 
the payment of the extra fee because its reimbursement only benefits the uninsured while 
it has to be disbursed for all. The physicians’ best response to a lower basis fee is to 
increase the extra fee even more. This means that access to physicians’ services is even 
more restricted for the non-privately insured and sometimes for the privately insured as 
well. We show that this can also occur when we allow physicians to price discriminate 
between the privately and the non-privately insured.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model used 
to analyze these issues. Section 3 presents and analyzes two polar cases: The ‘Laissez-
faire’ case with no negotiated basis fee and the fully regulated case with no balance 
billing. Section 4 then combines the regulator's setting of a basis fee with the possibility 
of balance billing. Section 5 extends to the existence of some privately insured 
individuals. Section 6 concludes. 
2 The model 
We model the relationship between a representative physician, a continuum of 
individuals of mass 1 and a regulator. Individuals are characterized by income I, 
uniformly distributed upon support [0, 1]. They consume y units of a numeraire good and 
x = {0, 1} visit to the physician. We assume that individual decisions concerning medical 
insurance are done previously and that their health has suffered a negative shock.1 The 
consumers’ problem is therefore as follows: 
                                                 
1 The take up of private supplemental insurance is explicitly modeled in Section 5 (Appendix 3). 
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€ 
Max
x,y
y + x.V − L   
€ 
s.t.
y + x.P ≤ I
y ≥ 0
x = 0,1{ }
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ 
⎩ 
⎪ 
 
where L represents the health loss suffered by the individuals; V is the value to patients of 
a visit to the doctor. We assume V > 1, to abstract from any moral hazard consideration 
and focus on the well-documented access issue. P is the part of the physician’s fee to be 
paid by the patient. Simplifying, we can write their utility as:  
€ 
U = I − L +V − P if x =1I − L if x = 0
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎩ 
 
and their decision resulting from their utility maximization as: 
€ 
x = 1 if I ≥ P and V ≥ P0 otherwise
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎩ 
   
Therefore, the physician’s demand and the consumers’ surplus are, respectively: 2 
D (P) = 1 – P,  and CS = (V – P).(1 – P) ,  provided 
€ 
V ≥ P . 
The representative physician aims at maximizing his net revenue: Π= (P + R – 
c)(1 – P), where R is the basis fee, P is the extra fee (consumers’ price) and c is a 
constant marginal cost, with c < 1. We discard physicians’ behaviors related to altruism, 
professional duty or paternalism. 
The public expenses related to paying the physician the basis fee are PE = R.D(P) 
= R.(1 – P). We assume that the regulator aims at maximizing the consumers’ surplus net 
of public expenses, S = CS – PE.  
In what follows, we analyze three cases on top of the laissez-faire case, to 
ultimately compare them with each other. First, we consider that the regulator decides on 
the level of the physician’s basis fee, without allowing the latter to charge an extra fee to 
his patient. In that case, there is no room for supplemental insurance. In the second case, 
we allow the physician to balance bill while supplemental insurance is ruled out. Third, 
                                                 
2 We only consider the part of the consumers’ surplus that is directly related to the visit to the physician. 
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the physician can balance bill and a proportion λ of patients is privately insured against 
disbursing an extra bill. 
To guarantee interior solutions, we also assume that V < 2 + c. 
3 Benchmark: Two polar cases 
The first is the pure market solution with neither public universal insurance nor 
private supplemental insurance. The physician decides upon his fee P so as to maximize 
his net revenue: 
Π = (P – c).D(P) = (P – c).( 1 – P). 
The solution fee and the corresponding demand, physician’s net revenue and consumers 
surplus are, respectively: 
€ 
PLF =
1+ c
2 ;   
€ 
DLF =
1− c
2 ;  
€ 
ΠLF =
1− c
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
; 
€ 
SLF = CSLF =
1− c
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ . V − 1+ c2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ . 
Only individuals with an income above 
€ 
PLF  can afford a visit to the physician. 
In the second polar case, the patients are fully insured: the health authority 
reimburses the basis fee and no extra fee can be billed (P = 0). Therefore, all patients are 
always better off with a visit to their physician and their utility from this visit is V, no 
matter what their income level is. No inequality appears here other than the direct 
income-related one. The resulting physician’s revenue, the consumers’ surplus and the 
public expenses are, respectively: 
Π = R – c; CS = V; PE = R. 
Anticipating this situation, the basis fee R is the solution to the following maximization 
problem for the regulator: 
€ 
Max
R
V − R st R − c ≥ΠLF , 
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where the reservation revenue ΠLF is previously defined as the solution to the laissez-faire 
case. Notice that we implicitly assume full negotiation power on the regulator’s side. The 
solution is therefore: 
€ 
RFR =
1+ c
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
. 
The resulting payoffs are the following: 
€ 
ΠFR =
1− c
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
; 
€ 
SFR =V −
1+ c
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
. 
4 Balance billing and no supplemental insurance 
In the present case, the physician is allowed to bill an extra fee to the patients, to 
maximize his net revenue: 
Π = (P + R – c).( 1 – P). 
The best reply of the physician to the setting of a basis fee in the previous stage is: 
€ 
P = 1+ c − R2 . 
This extra fee is decreasing in the basis fee R. To decide the extra bill P, the physician 
trades off his revenue per patient against demand. When R increases, the revenue per 
patient increases as well, other things being equal. Therefore, a higher R allows the 
physician to focus more on demand when deciding the extra fee P. A lower P is then set 
to grant a higher demand. The corresponding payoffs are the following, for both the 
physician and the regulator: 
€ 
Π =
1− c + R
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
;  
€ 
S = 1− c + R2 V −
1+ c + R
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ . 
One step backwards, we solve for the basis physician’s fee in this case, which is 
the solution to the following regulator’s problem: 
€ 
Max
R
S = 1− c + R2 V −
1+ c + R
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
€ 
s.t. Π = 1− c + R2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
≥ΠLF . 
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The basis fee is therefore 
RBB = V – 1. 
Comparing this fee with the one obtained under full reimbursement, we obtain the 
following result. 
Proposition 1 
The basis fee can be higher when balance billing is allowed than when it is not. 
Formally, using 
€ 
˜ V =1+ 1+ c2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
 where 
€ 
1 < ˜ V < 2 + c , 
€ 
RBB ≥ RFR ⇔ V ≥ ˜ V 
RBB < RFR ⇔ ˜ V < ˜ V 
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎩ 
 
The intuition behind this result is the following. On top of increasing the 
physician’s revenue, the basis fee R plays the role of limiting the extra fee P, paid directly 
by the patient. Therefore, the regulator needs not aim at the lowest R since he trades off 
patients’ surplus (the importance of which is increasing in the value V) against public 
expenses, even though the participation constraint of the representative physician would 
have been satisfied with a lower reimbursed basis fee. This effect was not present when 
balance billing was forbidden.  
The table presented in Appendix 1 summarizes the solution to this case, together 
with the polar cases presented in the benchmark and the case allowing supplemental 
insurance, analyzed in the next section. This table helps establishing the following 
results. 
Proposition 2 
The fee P is lower when balance billing is associated to a reimbursement, than under the 
laisser-faire situation. Formally, PLF > PBB > PFR = 0. 
Therefore, reimbursement still improves access to physicians’ services, even if not for 
everyone.  
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Proposition 3 
The public expenses can be higher when balance billing is allowed than when it is not, 
despite the lower demand for physician’s services under balance billing. Physician’s 
revenue is higher when balance billing is allowed while the consumer surplus net of 
public expenses decreases with balance billing. 
Formally, 
€ 
DBB < DFR , 
€ 
ΠBB >ΠFR , 
€ 
SBB < SFR , and there exists 
€ 
ˆ V  with 
€ 
˜ V < ˆ V < 2 + c , such that 
€ 
PEBB ≥ PEFR ⇔ V ≥ ˆ V 
PEBB < PEFR ⇔ V < ˆ V 
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎩ 
 
 Proof: See Appendix 2 
This means that balance billing does not always allow saving on public expenses 
dedicated to physicians’ fees, contrary to the purpose of the 1980 law in France that 
allowed BB. 
5 Balance billing and supplemental insurance 
We now consider that potential patients can take up partial private insurance 
against the disbursement of the extra fee P. Against the periodic payment of a premium q, 
individuals disburse only a share a of the fee P in case of illness. We analyze this 
decision in Appendix 3 and show that the demand for private insurance, denoted λ, in this 
competitive market is independent on the endogenous variables of our model. Therefore, 
we can consider the stage concerning the representative physician’s problem 
independently from the private insurance choice problem since the latter is independent 
of the physician’s choice of P, at equilibrium. 
A proportion λ of the patients are privately insured and pay only aP when sick.3 
Their total demand for physicians’ services is λ.(1 − aP). The remaining proportion of 
patients pay the extra fee in full and their problem is equivalent to the one under balance 
                                                 
3 In what follows we use the notation λ as such because its expression is based on an exogenous variable 
only (see Appendix 3). 
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billing without supplemental insurance. Their demand is thus (1 − λ).(1 − P) and the total 
demand faced by the physician is as follows: 
D(P) = λ.(1 − aP) + (1 – λ).(1 – P) = 1 – P + e P, 
where the term e = (1 − a) λ  is used to illustrate the extent of private insurance. If the 
private insurance had no effect on the extra fee P, the total demand for physician’s 
services would naturally depend positively on the extent of private insurance. This is the 
direct effect of private insurance. 
The physician sets the extra fee to maximize his revenue: 
Π = (R + P – c) . (1 – P + e P). 
The solution to this problem gives us the physician choice of P as a best reply to the basis 
fee R: 
€ 
P = 12
1
1− e − (R − c)
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ . 
This fee is increasing in the extent of private insurance, e. Therefore, for a given level of 
the basis fee, the access to physicians’ services is more severely restricted for the 
uninsured when supplemental coverage applies. Also, as in the former case, it is 
decreasing in R. The corresponding demand and total physician’s net revenue are as 
follows: 
€ 
D = 1+ (1− e)(R − c)2 ;  
€ 
Π =
1
1− e
1+ (1− e)(R − c)
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
. 
The demand is surprisingly enough decreasing in the extent of private insurance, e, while 
the total net revenue is increasing in it. The extent of private insurance influences the 
demand through two opposite effects. We already mentioned the first, direct effect: More 
insured individuals imply more visits to the doctors since more people are better 
reimbursed. However, this also increases the extra fee, decreasing the demand from those 
who are not privately insured. The second effect dominates the first one here. 
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Notice that the physician’s profits are always higher than in the laisser-faire 
situation, whatever the level of the basis fee R: 
€ 
Π =
1
1− e
1+ (1− e)(R − c)
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
> ΠLF =
1− c
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
. 
Therefore, one step backwards, the regulator’s problem reduces to: 
€ 
Max
R
S = λ V − aP − R( ) 1− aP( ) + (1− λ) V − P − R( ) 1− P( )  
€ 
such that P = 12
1
1− e − (R − c)
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ . 
The solution basis fee is therefore:  
€ 
RSI =V −1−
e
1− (1− a)e 2 + a V − c −
2 − e
1− e
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎩ 
⎫ 
⎬ 
⎭ 
. 
It is lower than in the absence of private supplemental insurance:  
€ 
RSI < RBB =V −1. 
This means that the public fee reimbursement decreases when supplemental insurance 
and balance billing co-exist. The intuition for this lower public reimbursement of 
physician’s services is that it now only benefits those who are not privately insured while 
it must be disbursed for all. 
Given this level of basis fee RSI, the physician’s best response in terms of extra fee 
is therefore: 
€ 
PSI =
2 + e − (1− e)(V − c)
2(1− e + ae) . 
It is straightforward to show that this extra fee is higher with private insurance (e > 0) 
than without it (e = 0). This means that access to physicians’ services is even more 
restricted for the uninsured when supplemental insurance is available. There also exist 
some parameter configurations (high proportion of privately insured, λ, and low rate of 
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supplemental coverage, a) under which even the privately insured have less access than 
in the absence of private supplemental insurance: 
€ 
aPSI > PBB ⇔V − c >
2(1− λ) + aλ
(1− λ) + 2aλ . 
To summarize the effects of supplemental private insurance in a market for 
physicians’ services in which balance billing is permitted, the following result presents 
the overall comparison, based on the table in Appendix 1, between the present case with 
supplemental insurance and the one of the former section without supplemental 
insurance. 
Proposition 4 
The existence of a competitive market for private insurance against the risk of disbursing 
the totality of an extra fee to physicians, results in lower basis fees, higher extra fees, a 
lower demand for physicians’ services, i.e. a more restricted access for the non-privately 
insured and sometimes for the privately insured as well, and lower public expenses. 
Formally, RSI < RBB, PSI > PBB, DSI < DBB, PESI < PEBB and 
€ 
aPSI > PBB ⇔V − c >
2(1− λ) + aλ
(1− λ) + 2aλ . 
Public expenses are lowered by the existence of private insurance because the 
publicly reimbursed fees are lower and so is the demand for public reimbursements, i.e. 
for physicians’ services.  
We close this section considering that the physician can price discriminate 
between the privately insured and the others. In this case, the fees are as follows:4 
€ 
Pa =
1
2
1
a − (R − c)
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ;
 
€ 
P1 =
1
2 1− (R − c)( ); 
€ 
R1a =
(1− e)V + aec −1
1− e + ae . 
                                                 
4 We use the subscript a for the privately insured and the subscript 1 for the others. 
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This price discrimination goes in favor of the non-privately insured. However, the overall 
comparison is not affected by this new possibility. The next proposition summarizes the 
comparison between these results and the former cases. 
 Proposition 5 
When a competitive private insurance market coexists with the possibility to balance bill, 
and the physician can price discriminate between the privately insured and the others, 
the latter are better off than without discrimination but worse off than with no 
supplemental insurance at all. The privately insured are sometimes worse off as well 
when a market for supplemental insurance exists. 
Formally, R1a < RBB, PBB < P1 < PSI and 
€ 
aPa > PBB ⇔V − c >
1+ 2λ + aλ
1− λ + aλ . 
6 Conclusion 
We use a simple model to analyze the effects of (1) physicians’ BB and (2) 
supplemental insurance against the disbursement of the totality of the BB amounts. 
Compared with a situation without BB, we conclude that BB alone results in higher 
publicly reimbursed physicians’ basis fees, increased public spending and more restricted 
access to physicians’ services. The supplemental insurance only alleviates the effect on 
public expenses. Indeed, it decreases the public expenses because it decreases the basis 
fee, which actually reflects a lower protection of the privately uninsured. The extra fees 
paid by the privately uninsured increase, worsening even more their access to physicians’ 
services. When many people are insured and the private coverage of the BB amount is 
low, the partial payments of the extra fees by the privately insured increase as well. So 
private insurance may end up worsening access for all in some cases. This can also occur 
when we allow physicians to price discriminate between the privately and the non-
privately insured.  
All these effects are intuitive and likely to appear in more sophisticated models of 
physicians payments with BB. To add realism, these effects should be added to those 
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resulting from competition between physicians and from the possible existence of moral 
hazard on the patients’ side. The absence of competition between physicians in our model 
is still compatible with a situation where physicians have market power because of either 
high patients’ switching costs, or a limited supply of physicians’ services, or both. In 
turn, the absence of patients’ moral hazard in our model can reflect a situation where the 
access issue (prices too high for some people) is actually more important than the moral 
hazard issue (prices too low for some other people). 
 15 
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Appendix 1 - Summary table 
Laisser-faire Full reimbursement BB, no supplemental 
insurance 
BB & supplemental insurance 
€ 
PLF =
1+ c
2
 
€ 
PFR = 0 
€ 
PBB =1−
V − c
2
 
€ 
PSI =
2 + e − (1− e)(V − c)
2(1− e + ae)
 
€ 
RLF = 0 
€ 
RFR =
1+ c
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
 
€ 
RBB =V −1 
€ 
RSI =V −1−
e
1− e + ae 2 + a V − c −
2 − e
1− e
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎩ 
⎫ 
⎬ 
⎭ 
 
€ 
DLF =
1− c
2
 
€ 
DFR =1 
€ 
DBB =
V − c
2
 
€ 
DSI =
(1− e)2(V − c) − e(1− e − 2a)
2(1− e + ae)
 
€ 
ΠLF =
1− c
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
 
€ 
ΠFR =
1− c
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
 
€ 
ΠBB =
V − c
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
 
€ 
ΠSI =
1
1− e
(1− e)2(V − c) − e(1− e − 2a)
2(1− e + ae)
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
 
€ 
SLF =
1− c
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ V − 1+ c2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟  
€ 
SFR =V −
1+ c
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
 
€ 
SBB =
V − c
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
 
€ 
SSI = SCSI − PESI  
€ 
SCLF =
1− c
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ V − 1+ c2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟  
€ 
SCFR =V  
€ 
SCBB = V −1+
V − c
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
V − c
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟  
€ 
SCSI = λ(V − aPSI )(1− aPSI )
+ (1− λ)(V − PSI )(1− PSI )
 
€ 
PELF = 0 
€ 
PEFR =
1+ c
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
 
€ 
PEBB = V −1( )
V − c
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟  
€ 
PESI = DSIRSI  
 
Appendix 2 - Proof of Proposition 3 
€ 
DBB < DFR  and 
€ 
ΠBB >ΠFR  come from direct comparisons using the table in Appendix 1. 
Using the same table, we see that 
€ 
PEBB  is increasing in V. 
Evaluated at 
€ 
V = ˜ V , we have 
€ 
PEFR =
1+ c
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
 > 
€ 
PEBB =
V − c( ) V −1( )
2 . 
Evaluated at 
€ 
V = 2 + c , we have 
€ 
PEFR =
1+ c
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
 < 
€ 
PEBB =
V − c( ) V −1( )
2 . 
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Therefore, for 
€ 
V > ˆ V  high enough, PEBB > PEFR. 
A similar analytical argument is used to show that 
€ 
SBB < SFR  (available upon request from 
the author).          QED 
Appendix 3 - The demand for private insurance 
We use the dual theory formulation of expected utilities (see Yaari, 1987) to 
model individual choice of private insurance taking. 
Let µ be the true probability that an individual gets sick and needs to disburse the 
extra fee P. Let αµ be the individual perceived probability to get sick, with α > 1. There 
is a competitive insurance market offering partial coverage of the extra fee P (the partial 
coverage being (1-a)P) against the payment of a premium denoted q. Individuals will 
therefore take up insurance if: 
 
€ 
I − q −αµaP ≥ I −αµP ⇔ µ ≥ q
α(1− a)P
. 
Assuming that µ is uniformly distributed upon the support [0, 1], the demand for private 
insurance is therefore: 
€ 
λ =1− µ =1− q
α(1− a)P
. 
We now turn to the equilibrium premium q that prevails on a competitive private 
insurance market. This premium is such that profits of the insurance companies are zero: 
€ 
(q −
q
α(1−a )P
1
∫ µ(1− a)P) = q 1− q
α(1− a)P
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ −
(1− a)P
2 1−
q
α(1− a)P
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 1+ q
α(1− a)P
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ = 0⇔ q = α(1− a)P2α −1
. 
Therefore, the demand for private insurance in this competitive market is independent 
from the endogenous variables of our model: 
€ 
λ =1− q
α(1− a)P =1−
1
2α −1 =
2(α −1)
2α −1
. 
 
